Somaliland: An African Struggle for Nationhood and International Recognition
By Iqbal D Jhazbhay
Foreword By Professor Ali Mazrui
In 1960, amid considerable euphoria, the former British Somaliland unitedwith the former Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. This emerging post-colonial state was widely regarded as the closest an African country could beto a classical nation-state. The new Somali republic was homogeneous in language(almost everybody spoke Somali), homogeneous in religion (almost entirely Muslim), homogeneous in political culture (based on a system of clans), and almosthomogeneous in economic lifestyle (mainly pastoralist, but reinforced by fishingalong the coast).
In the course of this study, we retrace some of the steps taken by Somalia duringthe first 30 years of independence (1960 to 1990). The earliest years promisedthe evolution of a pastoral democracy. Somalia was close to being the most open society in postcolonial Africa. There were high levels of political participation,open debates, and impressive political eloquence in the emerging parliamentaryculture.Against such a background, it would have been tempting to study the Somali story not as a case of nation-building but as one of national demolition, not as acase of political development but as one of political decay. Part of the originalityof Iqbal Jhazbhay's approach has been to transform this agenda. Instead of focusing on the disintegration of the Somali Republic, he has turned his attentionto the resilience of Somaliland, which pulled out of the union in 1991. TheSomali Republic can be studied as a case of national disintegration, but Jhazbhay draws lessons from the experience of Somaliland as a case of national integration.
The wider Somalia illustrates political decay, while Somaliland is an experimentin political development – what Jhazbhay calls a 'bottom-up approach to nation-building'.Because of high levels of poverty among people such as the Somali, socialscientists have often been drawn to political interpretations based on economiccausality – indeed, some scholars studying developing countries have been drawn to neo-Marxist forms of economic determinism. Jhazbhay has resisted the lure ofeconomic explanations. He has opted instead for the primacy of culture as thecentral determinant of Somali behaviour. Thus he regards the main social forces at work among the Somali as 'culturally rooted, and internally driven'.
The pre-colonial legacy inherited by all Somali people was a culture of rulesrather than rulers. According to scholars, before Europeans arrived, Somali society was one of 'ordered anarchy'. Governance was ultimately based not on a state'smonopoly of physical force but on consensus-building within and among clans.There were no kings, sultans or emirs. The imposition of European colonial rule interrupted the tradition of 'orderedanarchy'. Nascent statehood was initiated. The colonial state certainly insistedon a monopoly of physical force.
When the British and Italians departed, and their two former Somali colonies united into one republic, there was, for a while,'order' without the 'anarchy'. This stable 'order' was soon undermined by whatJhazbhay calls 'the interplay of internal and external forces'. Mogadishu and its surroundings became increasingly militarized.
The pre-colonial tradition ofconsensus-building within and among clans was rapidly eroded. For a while, theSomali people experienced not 'ordered anarchy' but 'ordered tyranny', especially under Siad Barre. But the element of 'ordered' declined, and was replaced by 'tyrannyand disorder'.
The situation was exacerbated by the 'interplay between internal and external forces' during the Cold War. While the United States and Soviet Union competedfor the allegiance of Mogadishu, consensus within and among clans was increasinglyundermined. Tension between the clans of former British Somaliland and those of former Italian Somaliland escalated, and Puntland was caught in thecrossfire. In the course of the 1980s the Somali Republic descended into chaos – acondition of post-colonial anarchy without pre-colonial order. Jhazbhay takes us through the different stages of resistance, collapse, and conflict– illustrating what Ahmed Yusuf Farah has described as a 'culture of locallybased reconciliation-processing'.
The situation was exacerbated by the 'interplay between internal and external forces' during the Cold War. While the United States and Soviet Union competedfor the allegiance of Mogadishu, consensus within and among clans was increasinglyundermined. Tension between the clans of former British Somaliland and those of former Italian Somaliland escalated, and Puntland was caught in thecrossfire. In the course of the 1980s the Somali Republic descended into chaos – acondition of post-colonial anarchy without pre-colonial order. Jhazbhay takes us through the different stages of resistance, collapse, and conflict– illustrating what Ahmed Yusuf Farah has described as a 'culture of locallybased reconciliation-processing'.
After Northern Somalia's withdrawal from the Union in 1991, the Horn ofAfrica experienced 'A Tale of Two Somalias'. The Somalia of Mogadishu continuedto be a case of anarchy without order, while the Somalia of Hargeisa was gathering momentum as a case of 'bottom-up nation-building', rooted in culture andenergized from within.To what extent were the differences between the Somalia of Mogadishu(chaotic) and the Somalia of Hargeisa (relatively stable) due to the differences
between their former imperial powers (Italy and Britain)? Was the Italian legacypart of the explanation for Mogadishu's chaos? Was the British legacy part of theexplanation for the relative stability of the Somalia of Hargeisa? Jhazbhay does not buy such a simplistic explanation; instead, he ascribes the relative stability ofHargeisa to 'the efficacy of Africa's approach to bottom-up nation-building'.Some Somali analysts in Hargeisa regard the British legacy as relevant for relative stability, and the Italian impact as contributory to chaos. But this was notbecause British political culture in the United Kingdom was more stable than Italianpolitical culture in Rome. Hargeisa analysts have argued to me that British rule interfered less with indigenous clan culture in Hargeisa than Italian assimilationistpretensions had done in Mogadishu. British rule had therefore been less culturallyintrusive than Italian imperial rule.
Jhazbhay has not tapped these issues of comparative colonial policy as muchas he might have done. But he does allow for their relevance in 'balancing traditionwith modernity', and in 'comparative elite formation' under different colonial powers.
between their former imperial powers (Italy and Britain)? Was the Italian legacypart of the explanation for Mogadishu's chaos? Was the British legacy part of theexplanation for the relative stability of the Somalia of Hargeisa? Jhazbhay does not buy such a simplistic explanation; instead, he ascribes the relative stability ofHargeisa to 'the efficacy of Africa's approach to bottom-up nation-building'.Some Somali analysts in Hargeisa regard the British legacy as relevant for relative stability, and the Italian impact as contributory to chaos. But this was notbecause British political culture in the United Kingdom was more stable than Italianpolitical culture in Rome. Hargeisa analysts have argued to me that British rule interfered less with indigenous clan culture in Hargeisa than Italian assimilationistpretensions had done in Mogadishu. British rule had therefore been less culturallyintrusive than Italian imperial rule.
Jhazbhay has not tapped these issues of comparative colonial policy as muchas he might have done. But he does allow for their relevance in 'balancing traditionwith modernity', and in 'comparative elite formation' under different colonial powers.
The Somali have a love--hate relationship with the Arabs, but a great commitmentto Islam. I am delighted that Jhazbhay found my concept of 'Afrabia'useful in the Somali context. He is also fascinating on what he describes as 'the Global Islamic Civil War' in relation to the 'War on Terror'. Although the Somaliaof Hargeisa has been less fundamentally affected by the politics of Islamism andAl-Qaeda than the Somalia of Mogadishu, Jhazbhay has confronted these issues of radicalized Islam frontally. These are forces affecting all Somali in one way oranother.
Jhazbhay's study of the people of Hargeisa sometimes comes close to being acase of participant observation in the tradition of British social anthropology. He has conducted wide-ranging interviews both within Somaliland and outside, andsocialized with the people to get to know them better. He has also agonized withthem about the stressful politics of international recognition.
Jhazbhay's study of the people of Hargeisa sometimes comes close to being acase of participant observation in the tradition of British social anthropology. He has conducted wide-ranging interviews both within Somaliland and outside, andsocialized with the people to get to know them better. He has also agonized withthem about the stressful politics of international recognition.
Hargeisa people have often complained that the international community is ready to spend millions ofdollars on Mogadishu because it is chaotic, rather than spending any money atall on Hargeisa, precisely because it is stable. The international community is less interested in investing in the nation-building of Hargeisa than in the explosivetumult of Mogadishu. Jhazbhay has sympathized with these lamentations.This study contributes significantly to our understanding of the Horn of Africa in the context of wider international forces. It also contributes to a number ofdifferent theoretical concerns – ranging from the role of culture in nation-buildingto the emerging forces of radical Islam, and from the nature of post-war reconstruction to the dilemmas between self-determination and regional integration.
We salute it as a major scholarly success.
Professor Ali Mazrui
Professor in the Humanities
Binghamton University
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