Somalia: Nation's Contending Islamic Ideologies
Michael A. Weinstein
20 March 2009
analysis
With the decision on March 12 by the cabinet of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG.) to approve the adoption of Shari'ah as the country's legal system, it has become a near certainty that Somalia's new cycle of civil conflict will be framed ideologically by one or more variants of political Islam.
Prior to the T.F.G.'s president, Sh. Sharif Sh. Ahmad's request to the cabinet to transform the T.F.G.'s political formula from clan-based secularism to an as yet undefined Islamism, the major opposition movements to the T.F.G. were already Islamist.The apparent acquiescence of the coalition of international donors to the T.F.G. to the decision to adopt Shari'ah sealed the fate of secularism for southern and central Somalia, setting off a new experiment in Somalia's chronic search for a unifying national identity and a definition of its political community.
As it became clear in March that political Islam had triumphed ideologically in Somalia, the contending tendencies and actors enunciated positions that were more well defined and detailed than had previously been the case, in particular, Al-Shabaab.
In an important interview with Al-Jazeera on March 3 that deserves serious attention, Al-Shabaab's spokesman, Sh. Mukhtar Robow, provided the clearest statement to date of the movement's ideology and current strategy. Confirming a closed source on the ground who says that Al-Shabaab is the only political actor that has a coherent program, Robow presented a systematic account that moved from fixed strategic goals to flexible and adaptive tactics, nearly mirroring the Leninist theory and practice of Bolshevik revolution, with, of course, an Islamist content. Those who believe that Al-Shabaab is a collection of mindless "extremists" and "spoilers," who are simply "anti-peace" (U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's term) need to think twice.
In commenting on whether Al-Shabaab was linked to Al-Qaeda, Robow said that it was not organizationally, but was ideologically, stating that both groups shared the goals of implementing Shari'ah, rejecting "false borders and entities created by colonialism," uniting Islamic countries, and restoring the Caliphate - a succinct definition of Transnational Revolutionary Islam.
Just as Lenin insisted that goals remain fixed, but that tactics must be altered pragmatically according to circumstances, Robow said that whenever al-Shabaab considers taking an initiative, "we always think about whether it is appropriate to do it at this time." Currently, Robow explained, "we believe that we should move forward with caution." In particular, Robow stressed, it was most important that Al-Shabaab not get ahead of the people (another Leninist dictum). Using the example of alleged desecration of the graves of Sufi saints by Al-Shabaab, Robow commented that "if demolishing graves will force clans to take up arms, we need to stop and get people to understand the issue from a religious point of view."
The injunction to be cautious translates into a long march to the Caliphate. According to Robow, Al-Shabaab's capture of the former base of the transitional parliament, Baidoa, began the "right path" towards restoration of the Caliphate, which would be traveled step-wise from establishing a model Islamic administration in that town and then expanding out into the Bay region and beyond: "When you want to climb a tree, you start from the trunk; you do not jump to the leaves."
Announcing a tactical phase of consolidation and administration building, Robow remained firm in his ideological opposition to the T.F.G., which, he said, violates the Quranic injunction: "Do not mix justice with injustice." (The T.F.G., for Robow, is a hybrid of Islamists and "unbelievers.") He then went on to make Al-Shabaab's anti-democratic stance explicit: "Democracy says that the civilian population are the ones that rule and they will do whatever they want. God says he is in charge and no one else is." (Presumably, clerics will be God's "transmission belts.")
It is not the purpose here to judge whether or not Al-Shabaab can or will apply consistently Robow's "What is to be Done" interview, but just to reveal it as vintage modern vanguardist revolutionary ideology in Islamic dress. The point is that Al-Shabab has a rather sophisticated program that gives it an ideological advantage over other contenders.
In contrast to Robow's positive and considered strategy, the A.R.S.-A's Islamic Nationalism remains a resistance ideology based on national liberation. In an interview with Reuters on March 5, A.R.S.-A's ideological spokesman, Sh. Hassan Dahir Aweys, focused on opposition to the T.F.G. as a puppet of the Ethiopians and Western powers, claiming that his group were "freedom fighters" and that the T.F.G. were "traitors." Whereas Robow condemned foreign interference, but stressed the formation of an Islamic state; Aweys shifted the balance by espousing the goal of a "change is the system," but emphasizing that his adversaries were "fighting to stop any group that can employ Shari'ah law in Somalia." In traditional nationalist terms, Aweys justified armed resistance to the T.F.G. by saying that counter-force is necessary when "invaders try to force you to leave your religion, reject your nationhood and independence, and take your resources illegally." Rather than a long march to the Caliphate, Aweys made "freedom" the goal of the struggle: "The most important thing people need is freedom. The houses can be rebuilt, but a beautiful house without freedom is worthless."
Leaving aside A.R.S.-A's relative lack of traction on the ground, Aweys's version of Islamic Nationalism, centered, as it is, on liberation rather than on a program, lacks focus, leaving the future open to an unspecified range of Islamic political formulas. Aweys's vision was appropriate when Somalia was subject to Ethiopian occupation and one could speak of a resistance movement; it is less relevant in a period of civil conflict, in which actors control and attempt to administer blocks of territory as they contest them with other actors.That Aweys should say that Ethiopia's rhetorical support for Sh. Sharif, which must be coupled with its harboring and training of warlord militias, means that Addis Ababa is "still in charge," indicates his failure to adjust to the new political cycle.On March 19, A.R.S.A announced that it would form an alternative government to the T.F.G.; it remains to be seen whether it will generate a vision of an Islamic state and a program to achieve it.
In sharp contrast to Al-Shabaab's revolutionary and A.R.S.-A's resistance postures, both of which fall within received modern paradigms, Sh. Sharif's reformism is reactive, purposively vague, and seemingly expedient. In his letter to Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke requesting that the cabinet adopt Shari'ah, Sh. Sharif reportedly wrote that the action was necessary to forestall "prolonged fights," a justification that he later repeated at press conferences and in addresses. Caught between having to satisfy his clerical and clan bases, both of which favor implementation of Shari'ah, and the donor powers on which the T.F.G. is dependent financially, and which favor a secular government, Sh. Sharif, gave way to the former, but tried to mollify the latter.
Sh. Sharif's brand of impromptu reformism emerged at a press conference in Nairobi on March 12, where he began with the assurance that the Shari'ah that he had in mind for Somalia was not the strict version forwarded by Al-Shabaab, but a more modern variant that would allow women to serve in parliament (an issue raised by the armed opposition) and an acceptance of democracy, which he said "is not inherently against Islam."
As a compromise formation precipitated from the cross-pressures of base and donors, Sh. Sharif's Islamic Reformism is the weakest of the ideological contenders by virtue of its transparent use of political Islam as a means to the end of saving the T.F.G. and its resulting vagueness.
Ideology is not the determining factor in shaping political developments, but it provides an orienting vision of the future and a basis for mobilizing support and organizing action. As such, it is a form of power and an indicator of momentum. Considered in those terms, among the major domestic actors in southern and central Somalia, Al-Shabaab's programmatic perspective has the edge over A.R.S.-A, which is locked in the past, and the T.F.G., which appears to be purely reactive.
Although the analogy is only suggestive and speculative, it would be wise to keep in mind that Lenin's Bolsheviks prevailed over the populist and nationalist Social Revolutionaries, and the reformist Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution.
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